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Abstract 
Reforms often occur in waves, seemingly cascading from country to country. We argue 
that such reform waves may be driven by informational spillovers: uncertainty about the 
outcome of reform is reduced by learning from the experience of similar countries. We 
motivate this hypothesis with a simple theoretical model and then test it empirically. 
Our results confirm the presence of informational spillovers with respect to political 
liberalization but offer little support for informational spillovers with respect to 
economic reforms. 
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1 Introduction 
Political and economic changes often occur in waves, in a pattern sometimes described 
as domino effect: process of change initiated in one country appears to spill over the 
borders to other nearby and/or similar countries. Examples of this phenomenon in the 
political domain include the events of 1848 in Europe, emergence of new independent 
countries from the ruins of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires in the late 19th and early 
20th century, decolonization following the end of the 2nd World War, democratizations in 
Latin America in the late 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, and most 
recently the Arab Spring in the Middle East and the Occupy movement in Western 
countries. On the economic front, we observe waves similar, such as the Washington 
consensus reforms push forward in less developed and post-communist countries 
during the late 1980s and throughout 1990s. Reform waves can be observed also with 
respect to less dramatic changes. The ban on smoking in restaurants and bars, adopted 
first in Ireland has since spread to most of European countries. Eastern Europe, on the 
other hand, has experienced similar legislative spillovers with respect to the adoption of 
the flat tax, first introduced in Estonia in 1994.1 
What drives such waves? One explanation is that the events in one country or 
jurisdiction have a direct causal effect on the events elsewhere. This can be referred to 
as a domino effect: the tumbling of one brick in a sequence undermines the stability of 
the next brick and so on. An alternative explanation is that each of these waves 
represents a fad: events in one country are mimicked by people elsewhere. While these 
two phenomena are similar, there is an important qualitative difference between them. 
In the course of the domino effect, the events in one country depend on the outcome of 
similar preceding events elsewhere. With fads, people mimic behavior of others because 
they develop a taste for doing so –with the outcome of the event in question being less 
relevant.  
We argue that reform waves such as those discussed in the preceding examples 
represent domino effects rather than mere fads. The outcome of every reform is 
inherently uncertain and can be either positive or negative. Reversing an already-
                                                 
1In both cases, the innovation originated outside Europe: smoking bans were implemented in various US 
jurisdiction long before their introduction in Ireland while Hong Kong has had a flat tax for decades before 
its adoption in Estonia.  
implemented reform, furthermore, is costly. Uncertainty about reform outcome 
combined with costly reversal may cause efficiency-enhancing reforms to be postponed 
or not implemented at all: a phenomenon referred to as the status-quo bias (see 
Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, and Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Individuals, however, can 
infer important signals about the likely outcome of the reform by observing the 
outcomes of similar reform implemented elsewhere. If the reform outcome turns out 
positive in one country, then other similar countries become more likely to implement 
the same reform; a negative outcome in one country can stop the reform in its track in 
other countries too.  
We denote these signals informational spillovers. While much of the literature on the 
relationship between reforms and uncertainty has been written with economic reforms 
in mind, we expect spillovers to apply to political and economic reforms alike. If 
informational spillovers of reforms are important, we would expect nearby countries to 
be affected more strongly than distant ones. Similarly, events in countries that are 
similar with respect to cultural, political or historical legacies are likely to bear more 
weight than events in dissimilar countries. We therefore formulate our analysis in the 
framework of the gravity model. This approach has found wide-spread application in the 
trade literature where it explains the size and direction of bilateral trade flows 
remarkably well by relating them to the economic sizes of both countries and the 
distance between them. We posit, in line with the gravity model, that the reform 
spillovers between two countries should be proportional to the stock of reforms already 
present in the two countries and inversely related to the distance between them. To test 
for their presence, we look at the post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe (with our data spanning the period until the onset of the recent economic and 
financial crisis, i.e. 1990-2008). We consider the post-communist countries because of 
two reasons: (1) the vast majority of them at least attempted economic and political 
reforms during the period in question, and (2) this group of countries displayed a great 
deal of variation in the depth and outcomes of reforms implemented. We measure 
reforms using indexes of democratization and economic liberalization but also consider 
the possibility that there are spillovers with respect to economic outcomes of reform, 
economic growth and inflation. 
In the next section, we discuss the related literature on the role of uncertainty in 
determining the success of reforms and on spillovers or contagion effects in reforms. In 
section 3, we formulate a simple model of informational spillovers in reforms. We 
discuss the data in section 4, section 5 presents our methodology and section 6 presents 
our empirical findings. The last section then outlines our main conclusions.  
 
2 Related Literature  
The relationship between uncertainty and reform success has been explored extensively 
in the literature motivated by the reforms (and their failures) in Latin America and 
Easter Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) coined the 
term status-quo bias to describe situations when countries appear to reject reforms that 
are expected to increase overall welfare. They argue that this is due to uncertainty about 
the distribution of costs and benefits of the reform. In particular, it is possible that a 
reform that benefits the majority of the population ex post is nonetheless rejected ex 
ante. This is likely to happen if (some) voters expect their payoff from implementing the 
reform to be negative. Alesina and Drazen (1991), similarly show that uncertainty about 
the distribution of benefits and costs of reforms can lead to inefficient delays due to war 
of attrition. Dewatripont and Roland (1992 a,b; 1995) consider aggregate rather than 
individual uncertainty. They point out that that under uncertainty, reforms implemented 
gradually rather than in a big-bang fashion are more likely to succeed because their 
gradual implementation partially resolves the underlying uncertainty about their 
eventual outcome. If reform reversal is costly, gradual reform thus allows the voters to 
receive a signal about the outcome of the full reform. Depending on the signal, they can 
either implement the full reform or reverse the initial reform to return to the status quo. 
Doing so helps avoid reversing the full reform, which is assumed to be more costly than 
reversing a partial reform.  
The notion that reforms in one country can affect reforms elsewhere is not new. 
Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla (2008) and Campos and Horvath (2006) define this as a 
‘contagion effect’. They argue the term can be used not only for adverse effects but also 
for beneficial effects of reform. Brueckner (2000), analyzing welfare reform, argues that 
the level of benefit provision in neighboring states affects policymakers’ decision on the 
generosity of the welfare state.  
Brezis and Verdier (2003) formulate a theoretical model in which regime collapse in 
one country reduces the effectiveness of repression in another country. This is because 
democratization in a neighboring country makes it easier for repressed citizens to 
emigrate. That, in turn, reduces the ability of the dictator to repress protest and makes 
political liberalization more likely (in the same way as emigration of East Germans via 
Hungary eventually lead to the fall of the Berlin Wall). While spillovers of this kind 
appear, at a superficial level, similar to the informational spillovers considered in our 
paper, there is a crucial difference: Brezis and Verdier consider effectiveness of 
repression, not uncertainty about the preparedness of the government to repress 
protest and the outcome of such repression. Furthermore, the decision on reform is 
taken by the authoritarian government, not voters. As the events of the recent Arab 
Spring (and also the Romanian revolution of 1989) demonstrate, reforms often take 
place regardless of the willingness of dictators to allow them.  
Gassebner et al.’s (2011) propose a theoretical model of reform spillovers. The 
mechanism facilitating reform spillovers, however, is different from the one envisaged in 
our paper. They consider contagion of reforms because of inter-jurisdictional 
competition due to factor mobility as well as because of trade between countries, and 
argue that the former is more likely to play a role. They then proceed to test their model 
using data on a broad panel of countries, with reform measured by the index of 
economic freedom (Heritage Foundation). They find that economic reforms in other 
countries are indeed important for reform progress and that these spillovers are better 
facilitated by geographic and cultural proximity than by trade. Importantly, they only 
consider economic reforms and do not repeat their analysis for political changes.  
In the remainder of the paper, we develop a simple theoretical model of 
informational spillovers and their impact on reforms under uncertainty. We argue that 
this mechanism can be at work for economic and political reforms alike. We then test 
this model empirically on a sample of post-communist countries undertaking both kinds 
of reforms.  
 
3 Reform, Uncertainly and Informational Spillovers 
The fundamental problem of implementing political or economic reform is that their 
outcome is inherently uncertain. Attempts at political change may lead to democracy 
and rule of law but it can also degenerate into political instability, infighting or open 
political conflict. In 1989, Polish and Romanian transitions both started with broadly 
based popular protests and both ended up with their countries implementing wide-
ranging democratization and eventually jointing the EU. The initial trajectory, and the 
associated economic and human cost of the changes, were dramatically different. 
Similarly, Tunisian and Libyan protests both lead to the fall of the incumbent regime but 
at dramatically different costs. Economic reform, likewise, can bring about economic 
growth and rising living standards or it can give rise to unemployment and run-away 
inflation. The contrast, for example, between the outcomes of economic reforms in 
Russia and China, is especially poignant.  
The role of uncertainty about reforms and their outcomes was well recognized in the 
early transition literature (see Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Dewatripont and Roland, 
1992a,b and 1995; and others). This literature shows how uncertainty about the 
outcome of the reform (or its distributional implications) can lead to it being 
inefficiently postponed or abandoned altogether. Reducing the uncertainty therefore can 
be the key to the successful implementation of the reform. Dewatripont and 
Roland(1992a,b) show that gradual reform is associated with partial resolution of 
uncertainty about the outcome of the full reform. In their framework, a partial reform is 
never optimal on its own – but the cost of reversing a partial reform is lower than that of 
reversing the full reform. By implementing the partial reform first, the voters obtain a 
signal about the outcome of the full reform. With this signal, and with the resulting 
reduction in uncertainty, they can make a better informed choice whether to continue 
with the remaining reform measures or reverse those already implemented.  
We formulate a simple three-period model which builds on Dewatripont and Roland 
with a crucial difference: in our framework, the resolution of uncertainty comes from 
observing the experience of other countries. Consider country i with a continuum of 
risk-averse voters. The voters can be heterogeneous but we only consider uncertainty 
about aggregate outcomes (i.e. those common for all voters). The status quo is 
associated with a negative payoff that accrues to all voters; the period value of that 
payoff is –i. This disutility can stem either from economic policies or political repression 
in the status quo: excessive state interference in the economy, distortionary taxes, 
tolerance of smoking in public places or disregard for political rights of individuals. The 
status quo can be amended by implementing a reform; the outcome of that reform, 
however, is uncertain, and may even be worse than the status quo. Based on the 
information available before the reform, the voters can form expectations about the 
period value of the reform’s outcome. Let E(iIi)be the expected value of the future 
payoff, i, conditional on the information available at present, Ii. For simplicity, we 
assume that the same payoff will accrue in every period after the implementation of the 
reform, unless the reform is reversed. If the outcome of the reform is worse than the 
status quo, the reform can be reversed in the third period; reversal is associated with 
cost –i and the decision whether to maintain the reform or reverse it is taken at the end 
of the first period, after the payoff is revealed (and incurred). If the reform is reversed, 
the reversal cost is incurred and thereafter the status-quo payoff is again restored. For 
simplicity, we assume that the status quo payoff and reversal costs are not uncertain.  
Assuming no informational spillovers (autarky), the return from implementing the 
reform will be  
E(iIi) + E(iIi) + 2E(iIi) (1) 
in case the reform is maintained, and  
E(iIi) – i – 2i (2) 
if it is reversed. The payoffs that accrue during the second and third periods are 
discounted by discount factor . 
The reform therefore will be implemented if  
E(iIi)>–i (3) 
where Ii is stands for all the information available to the voters in country i, including the 
information on expected distribution of the reform’s payoff, and it will be maintained if  
i+ i> –i– i (4) 
Note that the decision whether to maintain or reverse the reform is based on the actual 
outcome, revealed as the reform has been implemented, rather than its expectation.  
Now we consider the case with informational spillovers. We assume the outcomes of 
reforms implemented elsewhere can be observed only with a lag. Therefore, voters in 
country i have an additional option: to postpone implementing the reform in order to 
observe its outcome in countries that have already implemented it. In that case, the 
information set available to voters in country i is ,.  is the vector of actual outcomes 
in the other countries, 1,…,n while  is a vector of parameters 1,…,n depicting how 
similar the conditions in the various other countries are to the conditions in country i. 
This strategy therefore yields a payoff  
–i + E(i,)+ 2E(i,) (5) 
in case the reform is maintained, and  
–i + E(i,) – 2i (6) 
if it is reversed. The conditions for maintaining or reversing the reform are similar as 
before except that now this decision takes place at the end of the second period rather 
than the first period.  
Postponing the reform is costly: it results in the negative status-quo payoff being 
incurred for one additional period (first term in the payoff functions (5) and (6)). The 
cost of doing so, however, may be outweighed by the benefit of improving the precision 
of the voters’ expectations of the reform’s outcome in the next two periods. If the 
informational spillovers from the other countries are significant, then this helps avoid 
the potential additional cost of having to reverse a reform whose outcome is worse than 
the status quo.  
This result is similar to that of Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) who argue that 
gradual reform helps reduce uncertainty about the reform outcome. In this case, the 
reduction of uncertainty stems not from the reform being implemented gradually but 
from postponing it and learning from the experience of others. Once the outcomes of 
reforms implemented elsewhere are observed, the reform can still be implemented in a 
big bag fashion. On the other hand, if the cost of maintaining the status quo is very high, 
then this strategy may not be optimal.  
Informational spillovers such as those discussed in the model above are likely to be 
one reason for political or economic changes occurring in waves, as was the case in the 
post-communist countries during 1989-91 or in the Middle East during 2011. For 
example, the decision of Polish and Hungarian communist governments not to suppress 
popular protests and then to engage in negotiations with the opposition in spring and 
summer of 1989 was likely to have been instrumental in encouraging the subsequent 
protests in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in fall of that year. Had either government 
chosen to crack down on the protests as later happened in Romania, the enthusiasm for 
political change may well have waned throughout the region. Similarly, the positive 
outcome and relatively low cost of political change in Tunisia in spring of 2011 is likely 
to have encouraged similar protests throughout the Middle East. It is also not surprising 
that the remaining authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea and China, seek to 
suppress the spread of information about the on-going changes in the Middle East.2  
On the economic front, the countries that initiated reforms relatively late benefited 
from learning from the experience of Poland and Hungary whose reforms were initiated 
in 1990. The (predominantly negative) experience with partial economic reforms in the 
former Yugoslavia in the course of the 1980s also could have had informational value.  
Last but not least, the experience of other countries can help also with respect to 
selecting the toolkit for facilitating change. The reliance on text messages and social 
networks to organize political protests in Iran in the wake of the 2009 election was 
replicated throughout the Middle East in 2011 and is likely to have contributed to the 
success of those movements.3 Economic reforms such as the voucher privatization 
during the early to mid 1990s, pension reform in mid to late 1990s or the introduction 
of the flat tax in the 2000s also proceeded in waves.  
We therefore hypothesize, in line with our model, that the progress in political or 
economic reform should be related to spillover effects emanating from the stock of 
previous reforms implemented elsewhere, corresponding to the vector . The intensity 
of informational spillovers, furthermore, is also likely to depend on the extent of 
similarity between the two countries, as captured by vector  in our model. We 
therefore expect the spillovers to be higher for geographically as well as culturally close 
countries.  
We test our model on a sample of post-communist counties during the 1990s and 
2000s. We focus on these countries because virtually all of them at least attempted to 
                                                 
2 The government of North Korea was reported to stop its citizens who used to work in Libya under the 
Qaddafi regime from returning (see “North Korea bans citizens working in Libya from returning home,” 
The Telegraph, 27 October 2011. China regularly suppresses news about popular protests in its media, 
regardless of whether those protests took place in China or elsewhere. Websites such as Facebook and 
Twitter, which helped coordinate protest in the Middle East and elsewhere, have been blocked in China. 
Searches for keywords such as ‘Jasmine revolution’ on google.com and baidu.com results in dramatically 
different list of entries.  
3 The Chinese government has learned this lesson too and responded to the 2009 unrest in Xinjiang by 
suspending mobile-phone and internet services in the province.  
implement economic and political reforms during this period. The reform strategies as 
well as their outcomes, however, differed substantially across countries. This sample 
thus offers sufficient variation in the reform programs, both in the economic and 
political domain.  
 
4 Data 
The analysis is carried out with 29 post-communist countries.4 The political and 
economic reforms we consider started in the early 1990s. Correspondingly, our data 
cover the years 1990 to 2008. We use 2008 as the cut-off year to ensure that we capture 
the reform period but avoid including the current economic and financial crisis.  
We only consider spillovers among post-communist countries and thus ignore the 
rest of the world. This is due to the fact that, at least during the early phase of political 
and economic changes in these countries, the experience of other similar countries is 
more likely to be relevant than the experience of established democracies and market 
economies. In essence, this approach is equivalent to assuming that the political-cultural 
distance between Eastern and Western European countries was sufficiently large during 
most of this period to make the spillovers negligible. Furthermore, while the political 
and economic systems were changing dramatically in Eastern Europe during this period, 
the situation in the West remained relatively stable. Therefore, inasmuch as the changes 
in the East were affected by observing the practice in the West, such spillovers are 
unlikely to change much over time.  
To capture the countries’ progress in implementing market-oriented reforms, we 
use the average of the eight progress-in-transition indicator compiled and published 
annually by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).5 We 
exploit the World Bank Development Indicators 2009 as the source of all 
                                                 
4Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Monte Negro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
5 These indicators measure each country’s progress in the following fields: price liberalization, foreign 
exchange and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale privatization, enterprise reform, 
competition policy, banking reform, and security markets and non-banking financial institutions. Each 
indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed centrally-planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is 
common in this  literature, we replace plus and minus distinctions  by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 
4+ becomes 4.33 while 4- is 3.67). We do not use the more recently available EBRD indicators of 
infrastructure reform, only the eight original indicators measuring progress in Washington-consensus 
reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).  
macroeconomic variables, except for unemployment rates which we obtained from the 
EBRD Transition Reports (various issues). We use the average Freedom House 
democracy index6 and Kaufmann and al.’s (2009) governance indicators to take account 
of the progress in political and institutional transitions. Finally, we take account of 
periods of war using the Correlates of War (2010) dataset.   
 
5 Methodology 
Our theoretical model predicts that informational spillovers between countries should 
decline with distance, which, furthermore, can be interpreted both as geographical or 
cultural proximity. We therefore use a gravity-model approach, relating spillovers in 
market-oriented and political/institutional reforms between two countries to the stock 
of reforms already implemented in both countries, the distance between them as well as 
common cultural and historical legacy.  
The gravity model, which has found wide application in trade literature, takes its 
inspiration from the theory of gravity in physics. The basic formula for the force of 
gravity is as follows:7  
     
    
   
  
The force of gravity, F, between two entities i and j is thus proportional to the masses of 
the two entities, mi and mj, the distance between them, dij, and the gravitational constant, 
G. Applied to the study of economic phenomena in our specific analytical context, the 
gravity model takes the following form (omitting time subscripts for simplicity): 
    
     
(         )
  
where Yi stands for the variable of interest in a given country such as the stock of 
democracy or economic reform. Yi, stands for the first difference of this variable which 
we seek to explain by relating it to economic or political interaction between the two 
countries. The terms in the denominator, dij and cultij, capture the geographical and 
                                                 
6Specifically, this index is the average of the Freedom House measures of political freedoms and civil 
liberties, rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 
7 (fully free).  
7 See Baldwin and Taglioni (2005).  
cultural distance between the countries. A, finally, is a constant term. Note that our 
formulation of the gravity differs from its most common application in economics, the 
gravity model of trade, in that the dependent variable is the change of variable of 
interest (economic or political reform) in one country rather than a bilateral flow such 
as trade between two countries.  
The actual regressions that we estimate take the following linearized form:  
Yit =  + 1Yit-1 + 2Yjt-1 + 3Yjt-1*Distanceij + 4Yjt-1*Contiguityij + 5 Yjt-1*SmCntryij  
+ 6*Distanceij + 7*Contiguityij + 8*SmCntryij + 9Warit + 10Warjt + i + t + it 
where the following variables are included: 
Yit– progress democratization, economic reform or economic performance in the ‘home’ 
country (first country in the pair), with Yit being the annual change of this variable, that 
is, the variable of interest; 
Yj – level of democratization, economic reform or economic performance in the other 
country; 
Distanceij – distance between country i and j;  
Contiguityij – dummy variable controlling for the presence of a common border between 
the two countries;  
SmCntryij – dummy variable for the countries that used to belong to be part of the same 
country in the past (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia) 
Warit, Warjt – dummies distinguishing observations when country i or country j, 
respectively, was affected by a military conflict 
I, t – fixed effects for countries (first country in the pair) and years  
We consider two types of reform: political liberalization (democratization) and 
economic liberalization. In addition to indexes of reform, we also test for spillovers in 
economic performance (economic growth and inflation) which can reflect spillovers in 
reform. We consider both economic reform and economic performance because a-priori 
it is not clear whether the spillovers should be observed in somewhat arbitrary (and 
potentially subjective) indexes or in the variables that reflect the actual and tangible 
outcomes of economic liberalization. Furthermore, when considering economic reform, 
we look both at the aggregate index and its individual component sub-indexes. 
The dependent variable is thus the change in the measure of interest in country i at 
time t. This we relate to the lagged level of the respective variable in the same country 
and its lagged levels in all other countries. Furthermore, we interact the levels of the 
index in the other country with distance and dummies for contiguity (sharing a common 
land border) and historical legacy (belonging to the same country in the past, which, in 
this group of countries, applies to the former member states of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). It is this set of interaction terms that we expect to 
capture spillovers: reform and democratization spillovers should increase with the stock 
of reform in the other countries, decline with distance and they should be higher for 
countries that share a common border and/or those that have common historical 
legacies. In other words, we expect 2 to be positive, 3 negative, and 4 and 5 both 
positive.  
For the sake of methodological consistency, we also include the distance and 
dummies for contiguity and same country on their own. Nevertheless, there is little 
reason to expect them to be significant or to have a particular sign: it is only in their 
interaction with the stock of reform or democratization that they become meaningful. 
We also include dummies reflecting whether either country was involved in a military 
conflict (internal or external) during year t. Finally, all regressions contain country-
specific fixed effects. Year dummies are included when so indicated in the Tables below.  
We estimate similar regressions for economic growth and inflation. However, given 
that growth and inflation rates already are flow rather than level variables, the 
dependent variables are not first-differenced.  
 
6 Results 
We test for spillovers in democratization (Table 1), economic reform, where we consider 
both the overall progress (Table 2) and progress in the eight sub-areas distinguished by 
the EBRD (Table 3), economic growth (Table 4) and inflation (Table 5). The results 
reveal an interesting pattern.  
The past level of own democratization and reform is always strongly significant and 
has a negative effect on further progress. The negative sign stems from the fact that both 
indexes are bound from above. Therefore countries that have already achieved a 
relatively high degree of economic or political freedom should experience lower 
incremental progress. On the other hand, the past level of own economic growth and 
inflation display positive effects: economic performance is strongly persistent.  
The effect of the past level of democracy in other countries is positive, although it 
only appears significant when we also control for year fixed effects. This suggests that 
progress in democratization in other countries indeed encourages democratization in 
the home country. In contrast, the pattern observed for the index of economic reform is 
mixed: it appears positive in the regressions with country fixed effects only but turns 
negative when include year fixed effects. Growth and inflation in the other countries also 
appear to have positive effects on economic performance in the home country.  
What is especially interesting is the effect of the progress in reform in other 
countries interacted with distance and with dummies for common border and common 
historical legacy. The pattern that we observe for democratization is in line with our 
expectations: the effect of democratization interacted with distance is negative, 
suggesting that the positive spillover effect from democracy in other countries indeed 
diminishes with distance. Common border does not appear to facilitate spillovers while 
the effect of common legacy (belonging to the same country in the past) is positive and 
significant. Hence, we obtain strong evidence of spillovers in democratization which 
decline with geographic distance and increase with cultural/historical proximity.  
The pattern observed for the index of economic reform, however, is the opposite: the 
spillovers appear to increase with geographic distance, contrary to our expectations. 
Looking at the individual sub-indexes, we find the expected pattern (spillovers declining 
with distance) for enterprise reform, competition policy and security markets, and the 
opposite pattern for large-scale privatization, price liberalization and trade 
liberalization (with the coefficients estimated for the remaining two sub-indexes being 
insignificant). Hence, unlike with democratization, we cannot confirm the predictions of 
our model for economic liberalization.  
We find no evidence of spillovers in growth with respect to geographic distance. 
Inflation in the other country, on the other hand, displays spillovers declining with 
geographic distance: inflation in nearby countries matters more than inflation far away. 
Therefore, while we find little support for our model’s predictions with respect to the 
index of market-oriented reform, we do find such support with respect to inflation: 
countries’ success in stabilizing and reigning in inflation seems to be helped by inflation 
stabilizations in nearby countries.  
As a robustness check, we also replicated our analysis by splitting the sample into 
Central and Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. In this way, we 
only consider potential spillovers within relatively homogenous groups. The results 
(available upon request), however, are very similar to those obtained with the full 
sample.  
 
7 Conclusions 
We address the question of what drives the apparent waves of political and economic 
changes that have been observed repeatedly throughout history. We argue that the 
mechanism behind such waves goes beyond mere fads, whereby the proponents of 
change seek to mimic the policies implemented in other countries. Rather, we argue that 
the reform waves reflect learning and resolution of uncertainty about the outcome of 
reforms, a phenomenon which we dub informational spillovers. Observing the outcome 
of reforms implemented elsewhere reduces uncertainty and thus helps voters and policy 
makers make better informed decisions.  
To this effect, we formulate a simple model of reform spillovers. The model 
demonstrates that countries can reduce uncertainty about the reform outcome by 
observing the experience of other countries that implemented the same or similar 
reform earlier. This, in turn, should help reduce the status-quo bias highlighted in the 
previous literature.  
We test our model’s predictions on a sample of countries that implemented political 
and economic reforms during the 1990s and 2000s: the formerly communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. We find strong support for the presence of spillovers in 
political reform when considering democratization. In contrast, the data offer limited 
support for reform spillovers in economic liberalization. Specifically, we find no 
evidence of reform spillovers when using an index of progress in economic liberalization 
but we do find support for spillovers when looking at inflation. Inasmuch as inflation 
reflects progress in liberalization and stabilization, the latter finding supports our 
theoretical model.  
These results suggest that the experience of other countries indeed plays an 
important role in mobilizing support and maintaining momentum for reform. The fact 
that spillovers appear especially important with respect to political reform should not 
come as surprising. The success of political reform crucially hinges on the ability of the 
reformers to garner and maintain popular support for their cause. This is a standard 
collective action problem: while many would benefit from the changes, few are willing to 
risk life and limb to make change happen if the outcome is highly uncertain. Observing 
successful democratizations in other countries helps reduce the uncertainty and thus 
reduces the underlying collective action problem.  
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Table 1 Spillovers in Democratization  
 
 (2)  (4)  (2)  (4) 
 
 Democracy  Democracy  Democracy  Democracy 
Democracyi,t-1 -.366954*** -.304165*** -.367148*** -.304295*** 
 
(0.00406) (0.00438) (0.00407) (0.00438) 
Democracyj,t-1 0.00191 .0176791*** -0.00016 .0160214*** 
 
(0.00468) (0.00441) (0.00480) (0.00452) 
Democracyj,t-1 -7.62e-06*** -7.42e-06*** -7.01e-06*** -6.89e-06*** 
   * distance -1.61E-06 -1.50E-06 -1.64E-06 -1.53E-06 
Democracyj,t-1 -0.00048 -0.00581 -0.00285 -0.00763 
   * contiguity (0.00675) (0.00631) (0.00686) (0.00641) 
Democracyj,t-1 
  
.0196272* .0172322* 
   * same country 
  
(0.01044) (0.00976) 
Contiguity -0.00040 0.00375 0.00070 0.00493 
 
(0.00427) (0.00399) (0.00434) (0.00406) 
Distance  3.73e-06*** 4.23e-06*** 3.45e-06*** 3.93e-06*** 
 
-1.06E-06 -9.91E-07 -1.08E-06 -1.01E-06 
Same country 
  
-0.01101 -.0115537* 
   
(0.00737) (0.00689) 
War i -.0705208*** -.0613046*** -.0704774*** -.0612554*** 
 
(0.00276) (0.00280) (0.00276) (0.00280) 
War j -.0081149*** -0.0000261 -.0078464*** 0.0003305 
 
(0.00254) (0.00254) (0.00255) (0.00255) 
Constant .2283489*** .2817865*** .2295776*** .2828946*** 
 
(0.00495) (0.00489) (0.00499) (0.00493) 
R2 (overall) 
  
0.393 0.472 
Number 14744 14744 14744 14744 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE N Y N Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 2 Spillovers in Reform 
 
 (1)  (3)  (1)  (3) 
 
 Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform 
Reformi,t-1 -.1683442*** -.2396315*** -.1685045*** -.239645*** 
 
(0.00364) (0.00617) (0.00364) (0.00617) 
Reformj,t-1 .0112931** -.0097774** .0125533*** -.0080532* 
 
(0.00473) (0.00458) (0.00484) (0.00468) 
Reformj,t-1 3.84e-06** 4.27e-06*** 3.48e-06** 3.71e-06** 
   * distance -1.56E-06 -1.47E-06 -1.59E-06 -1.50E-06 
Reformj,t-1 0.0065455 0.0095283 0.0083685 .0123225* 
   * contiguity (0.00664) (0.00625) (0.00684) (0.00643) 
Reformj,t-1   -0.0097207 -.0167137* 
   * same country   (0.00954) (0.00898) 
Contiguity -0.001937 -0.0042597 -0.0023838 -.0055695* 
 
(0.00347) (0.00326) (0.00357) (0.00336) 
Distance  -1.19E-06 -1.86e-06** -1.11E-06 -1.62e-06** 
 
-8.16E-07 -7.68E-07 -8.30E-07 -7.81E-07 
Same country   0.0027927 .0084661* 
 
  (0.00545) (0.00513) 
War i -.0464183*** -.0608959*** -.0465004*** -.061092*** 
 
(0.00256) (0.00253) (0.00256) (0.00253) 
War j .0143264*** -0.0001553 .014275*** -0.0004753 
 
(0.00234) (0.00228) (0.00235) (0.00229) 
Constant .1009642*** .0450791*** .1005725*** .0442721*** 
 
(0.00389) (0.00408) (0.00391) (0.00410) 
R2 (overall) 
  
0.206 0.298 
Number 14744 14744 14744 14744 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE N Y N Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 3 Spillovers in Reform: Sub-indexes  
 
 (1)  (3)  (1)  (3) 
 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Small-scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reform 
Price 
Liberalization  
Reformi,t-1 -.2340667*** -.2356291*** -.3652138*** -.3870619*** 
 
(0.00591) (0.00538) (0.00672) (0.00653) 
Reformj,t-1 -.0099068* -0.00563 0.00785 -.0254382*** 
 
(0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00569) (0.00809) 
Reformj,t-1 4.57e-06*** 2.66E-06 -3.74e-06* .0000106*** 
   * distance -1.73E-06 -1.69E-06 -1.99E-06 -2.50E-06 
Reformj,t-1 0.00343 .0173446** -0.00142 .0402587*** 
   * contiguity (0.00756) (0.00733) (0.00839) (0.01097) 
Reformj,t-1 -0.00017 -.0321782*** 0.00005 -.0745549*** 
   * same country (0.01013) (0.01123) (0.01068) (0.01774) 
Contiguity -0.00139 -.0113723** 0.00043 -.0302362*** 
 
(0.00401) (0.00536) (0.00309) (0.00889) 
Distance  -1.74e-06* -1.75E-06 9.49E-07 -8.01e-06*** 
 
-9.05E-07 -1.25E-06 -7.23E-07 -2.07E-06 
Same country 0.00028 .0233743*** -0.00034 .0600623*** 
 
(0.00573) (0.00891) (0.00460) (0.01508) 
War i -.0595872*** -.0844862*** -.0504838*** -.0938655*** 
 
(0.00358) (0.00373) (0.00296) (0.00520) 
War j 0.00022 -0.00109 -0.00005 -0.00398 
 
(0.00322) (0.00333) (0.00267) (0.00465) 
Constant .0179117*** .0762429*** -0.0072455 .1995523*** 
 
(0.00555) (0.00624) (0.00458) (0.00910) 
R2 (overall) 
  
  
Number 14744 14744 14744 14744 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3 Spillovers in Reform: Sub-indexes (continued) 
 
 (1)  (3)  (1)  (3) 
 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Competit-
ion Policy Banking 
Security 
Markets 
Reformi,t-1 -.3096531*** -.2716599*** -.3036424*** -.2901597*** 
 
(0.00582) (0.00643) (0.00641) (0.00642) 
Reformj,t-1 -.0174528*** 0.00845 -0.00221 .0103465* 
 
(0.00587) (0.00604) (0.00555) (0.00584) 
Reformj,t-1 7.27e-06*** -3.67e-06* 6.72E-07 -4.96e-06** 
   * distance -1.87E-06 -2.11E-06 -1.84E-06 -2.03E-06 
Reformj,t-1 .0187031** -0.00517 .012995* 0.00645 
   * contiguity (0.00819) (0.00899) (0.00786) (0.00847) 
Reformj,t-1 -0.02007 -0.00057 -0.01213 -0.01524 
   * same country (0.01246) (0.01092) (0.01037) (0.01098) 
Contiguity -.012157** 0.00132 -0.00438 -0.00176 
 
(0.00598) (0.00308) (0.00352) (0.00304) 
Distance  -4.76e-06*** 8.71E-07 -2.50E-07 1.17E-06 
 
-1.46E-06 -7.00E-07 -8.04E-07 -7.10E-07 
Same country 0.01445 0.00013 0.00477 0.00424 
 
(0.00999) (0.00408) (0.00541) (0.00431) 
War i -.1325912*** -.0228324*** -.0569697*** -0.00089 
 
(0.00472) (0.00289) (0.00335) (0.00307) 
War j -0.00110 0.00060 0.00004 0.00024 
 
(0.00425) (0.00257) (0.00302) (0.00269) 
Constant .1488233*** -.0254791*** 0.0002817 -.0291103*** 
 
(0.00776) (0.00448) (0.00518) (0.00468) 
R2 (overall) 
  
  
Number 14744 14744 14744 14744 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4 Spillovers in Economic Growth  
 
 (7)  (9)  (7)  (9) 
 
Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Growthi,t-1 .4830076*** .4018085*** .4805672*** .401884*** 
 
(0.00701) (0.00748) (0.00701) (0.00747) 
Growthj,t-1 .0596379*** -0.00467 .0806019*** 0.00864 
 
(0.01219) (0.01141) (0.01268) (0.01193) 
Growthj,t-1 7.33e-06* 1.02E-06 7.50E-07 -2.66E-06 
   * distance -4.37E-06 -3.96E-06 -4.50E-06 -4.08E-06 
Growthj,t-1 .0349821* 0.02159 .0710457*** .0430332** 
   * contiguity (0.01886) (0.01707) (0.01978) (0.01796) 
Growthj,t-1 
  
-.143549*** -.0830067*** 
   * same country 
  
(0.02398) (0.02186) 
Contiguity  -0.12162 -0.02360 -0.20973 -0.05405 
 
(0.18994) (0.17163) (0.19695) (0.17815) 
Distance  -0.00004 -1.91E-07 -0.00003 1.41E-06 
 
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) 
Same country 
  
0.46500 0.15295 
   
(0.28866) (0.26118) 
Wari -12.98904*** -10.46142*** -13.08161*** -10.52839*** 
 
(0.31646) (0.29358) (0.31644) (0.29397) 
Warj -1.930652*** -0.00425 -1.958197*** -0.02498 
 
(0.28965) (0.26720) (0.28950) (0.26733) 
Constant 3.363923*** -3.08177*** 3.347727*** -3.082103*** 
 
(0.32272) (0.50367) (0.32254) (0.50352) 
R2 (overall) 
  
  
Number 13318 13318 13318 13318 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE N Y N Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5 Spillovers in Inflation  
 
 (8)  (10)  (8)  (10) 
 
Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation 
Inflationi,t-1 .5562112*** .400628*** .5559508*** .4012915*** 
 
(0.00657) (0.00725) (0.00657) (0.00726) 
Inflationj,t-1 .140716*** 0.0096345 .1458149*** 0.01357 
 
(0.01072) (0.00960) (0.01094) (0.00982) 
Inflationj,t-1 -.0000132*** -4.66E-06 -.0000148*** -5.70e-06* 
   * distance -3.62E-06 -3.07E-06 -3.69E-06 -3.12E-06 
Inflationj,t-1 -0.01988 0.00648 -0.00965 0.01383 
   * contiguity (0.01572) (0.01326) (0.01642) (0.01386) 
Inflationj,t-1   -.0439645** -.0326323* 
   * same country   (0.02191) (0.01859) 
Contiguity  -0.00222 -0.02368 -0.04598 -0.05071 
 
(0.05697) (0.04805) (0.05951) (0.05023) 
Distance  0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
   .189608** .1160557* 
   (0.07471) (0.06327) 
Wari 1.712604*** .8285991*** 1.715818*** .8310368*** 
 
(0.05029) (0.04485) (0.05031) (0.04487) 
Warj .7074714*** 0.00908 .709661*** 0.01167 
 
(0.04590) (0.04051) (0.04601) (0.04061) 
Constant -0.00745 1.57816*** -0.02544 1.571317*** 
 
(0.06354) (0.08140) (0.06393) (0.08152) 
R2 (overall) 
  
  
Number 12691 12691 12691 12691 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE N Y N Y 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
